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Abstract: This paper analyzes the relationship between religion and innovation in Europe. To the
best knowledge of the authors, no paper has been published about the association of religion with
innovation and innovative products and services, at an individual level, for all the countries that
belong to the European Union. This is the main goal of our paper. The results show that the
orientation of innovativeness depends on religion. This study contains a segmentation of the main
religions in Europe, taking into account their innovative profile. Connecting the characteristics
of the religious segments found and the innovations life-cycle concept, companies have a tool
to manage different innovations’ evolutive stages taking into consideration the religion of their
customers. The European policy-makers, still dominated by a traditional innovation approach, gain
a demand-side perspective to improve citizen’s innovativeness awareness and acceptance. Finally,
religiosity does not seem to have a very strong relationship with attitudes towards innovation once
we control for religious affiliation.
Keywords: innovation; religion; religiosity; Europe; consumer behavior; product life-cycle
1. Introduction
In 2010, more than 5.8 million people (84% of total world population) declared themselves religious
to some extent. That year, the major religious groups were Christians (32%), Muslims (23%), Hindus
(15%), Buddhists (7%) and Jewish (0.2%; Hackett et al. 2012). In the future, the global religious trends
projected by the Pew Research Center predict that by 2050 religiosity will increase in all the major
religious groups, except the Buddhist. Even atheists, agnostics and people that are not affiliate to any
religion, will represent a declining share of the world’s total population (Pew Research Center Religion
and Public Life 2015).
Iannaccone (2006) defines religion as ‘any shared set of beliefs activities and institutions premised
upon faith in supernatural forces’. Scholars pertaining to different social sciences disciplines have
studied religions, as a form of magical supernaturalism, and its relationship with science and
economy. Some key influential authors reach similar results about the inevitable decline of religion
due to the rationalization process inherent to capitalism (Bever and Styers 2017). Religion, as a
complex social phenomenon, has an effect on the economy (Parboteeah et al. 2015). Karl Marx
attempted to examine religion from a scientific perspective, stating that religion is an expression of
material realities and economic injustice. In his opinion, religion provides reasons to keep capitalism
working. When capitalism stagnates and rising living standards cannot be guaranteed, religion fades
(Marx and Stone 2014). In 1905, Max Weber argued that hard work and frugality eased the growth of
capitalism in Western Europe (Weber 1930). For Weber, the “disenchantment” of the world becomes
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apparent when religion is substituted by science in order to explain questions of values and morals
(Davis 2017; Weber 1946). Durkheim (1925) proposed that in modern societies, science would take the
role of religion and socialism would replace Catholicism. For him, the division of labor, an economic
arrangement, would bring along genuine morality (Durkheim 1926). Since then, many investigations
have been carried out trying to establish relations between religion and various and more precise
aspects related to the economy. Iyer (2016) made an extensive literature review of them concluding
that a new field of inquiry, called the new economics of religion, has arisen (McCleary 2011).
One of the promising areas where research has recently and rapidly increased is the study of the
relationship between religion and innovation (Bénabou et al. 2013, 2015; Barro and McCleary 2003;
Guiso et al. 2003; Cavalcanti et al. 2007; Becker and Woessmann 2009; Levy and Razin 2012;
Stark et al. 1996; Yerxa 2016; McCleary and Barro 2019; Carpantier and Litina 2019; Peifer et al. 2019;
Liu et al. 2018; Basedau et al. 2018; Sherkat 2017; Huang et al. 2016). Religion has an impact on
innovation, as has been demonstrated by different investigations. In Bénabou et al. (2013), they
uncovered a robust negative association between religiosity and innovation, holding across countries1
as well as US states. In a more recent study, Bénabou et al. (2015), using all five waves of the World
Values Survey, examined the relationships between eleven indicators of openness to innovation and five
measures of religiosity. They found that greater religiosity was almost uniformly and very significantly
associated to less favorable views of innovation. Our paper contributes to the literature of economics
of religion in the context of innovation.
The future of firms and countries is closely related to their capacity to innovate (OECD 2015).
A position as an innovative player will be necessary to gain a sustainable competitive advantage in the
global markets (Damm et al. 2019). From a European perspective, it seems relevant to study the extent
to which religious beliefs, and their associated practices, could favor or curb creativity and innovation
(European Commission 2015). Furthermore, it also seems important to estimate what will be the
projected evolution of that relationship in the coming years so that the economic, political and social
actors can consider it (Center for Religion Studies. Fondazione Bruno Kessler 2018). Additionally, the
Christian Churches having had a dominant position in social life in Europe (Pals 2006), it is interesting to
study how new religious movements and new forms of religions behave towards economic innovation
issues in the countries that belong to the European Union (Cooper and Patrick-Morsman 2019).
Results shed some light on the debate about the European religion exceptionalism that stresses
the peculiarity of the European experience with respect to the relationship between modernization and
secularization (Davie 2002).
After an in-depth literature review, we propose two hypotheses about the relation between
religiosity and innovation. The first one states that there is a negative relationship between religiosity
and attitudes towards innovation. The second one says that innovativeness orientation depends on
religion denomination.
We use the Eurobarometer 63.4 European Union Enlargement (European Communities 2005),
the European Constitution, Economic Challenges, Innovative Products and Services for testing our
hypotheses. This round of Eurobarometer surveys queried respondents on standard Eurobarometer
measures as well as questions about innovative products or services. The survey also contains several
demographic characteristics of respondents.
In order to explore if the relationships stated in the hypotheses hold, we perform a logistic
regression and interpret the results using their odds-ratios and marginal effects.
Finally, the profiles obtained are connected to the innovations’ product life-cycle. Managers
obtain a clear link between religion and innovations that allows them to better manage different
innovations’ evolutive stages attending to the religion of their customers. The European policy-makers,
1 Countries under study were those with information about number of patents filed by both residents and foreigners in
the World Intellectual Policy Organization (WIPO) database for the years 1980, 1990, 1995 and 2000. For more details see
Bénabou et al. (2013).
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still dominated by a traditional innovation approach, gain a demand-side perspective to improve
citizen’s innovativeness awareness and acceptance.
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
2.1. Evolution of Religiosity
Secularization has been a recurring theme in the sociology of religion (Pals 2006). Following the
secularization hypothesis (Norris and Inglehart 2011), we would expect a decreased religiosity due
to the effects of economic development and the associated increasing education and urbanization.
Previous investigations (Finke 2013; Iannaccone 1998) conclude that almost all advanced industrial
societies are evolving towards more secular orientations, yet the world as a whole has more people with
traditional beliefs than ever before and it seems set to remain so, or even increase, in the near future
(Pew Research Center Religion and Public Life 2015). Nevertheless, there is no general consensus
among scholars about the secularization theories (Zielin´ska 2013). The defenders of the secularization
thesis emphasize the loss of the sway and influence of religions (mainly Christian in Europe) in social
life (Bruce 1992, 2002, 2011, 2013). Critics, through the rational choice theory of religion, see the
secularization as the effect of a change at the individual level (individual beliefs, values, affiliations,
practices and religious rites), not at a societal one, as the defenders do (Stark 1992, 1999). They
also argue that modernization transforms religion, giving rise to the appearance of new religions or
transforming the existing ones (Crippen 1988). In their view, the situation of religiosity outside Europe
does not confirm the predictions of the secularization theories. It is the case the revitalization of Islam,
in its most puritan versions, in various countries of the Middle East region (Gellner 1992), and the
success of the conservative Protestantism in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia
(Zielin´ska 2013).
Some explanations for the failure of the envisioned secularization process can be found in the
writings of the ‘founding fathers’ of sociology (Pals 2006). The differences between the two opposite
positions found on the secularization theory stem from the difficulty in defining what religion is.
Marx (1843) proposed that religion, better than anything else, addresses the emotional needs of an
alienated and unhappy humanity. Some influential economists argue that the economic impact of the
today’s innovations may pale in comparison with those of the past, and are having high negative effects
on social (v. gr., impact of robotization on working conditions) and environmental issues (v. gr., climate
change; The Economist 2013, 2019). This ’innovation pessimism’ could be the reason why religion is
gaining momentum in society again. Weber (1978) maintained that the definition of religion could only
be elaborated at the end of a study, rather than at its inception. It means, in our case, not only studying
the Christian Churches but any other new religion movement or form. Furthermore, (Durkheim 1925)
remarked the limitations stemming from the cultural embeddedness of defining concepts, which have
to be universal. In this sense, the secularization hypothesis could not be generalized from the European
experience of Christian Churches to the rest of the world and religions because it is affected by an
ethnocentric approach.
Despite much of the research about religion and innovation is being based on U.S. data,
investigations on Europe show that secularization is greater within its territory due to supply
and demand effects (McBride 2010). A parallel question is the role of religion pluralism, religious
participation and its consequences in the societies and economic outcomes. We found results pointing
in two opposite directions: some authors say that pluralism reduces religious activity and so it fosters
the secularization process (Montgomery 2003), while others maintain the opposite: pluralism intensifies
religiosity (Finke and Stark 1988).
We need to understand which factors are associated with the increasing future role of religions in
the world, and particularly in Europe. The rational choice approach says that individuals are rational
consumers that behave and make decisions following a cost–benefit analysis even in religious affairs
(Iannaccone 1992). A model proposed by Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) identifies three motives for church
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attendance: “salvation motive” (expected afterlife consumption), a “consumption motive” (satisfaction
with current church attendance) and a “social-pressure motive” (where church attendance directly
increases the chance of success in business). The latter is the more interesting for our purposes. In
order to reach a deeper insight of the aforementioned, the Club Goods Model explains how people
embrace a religion based on social-pressures (Iannaccone 1992). This model considers religion as a
club where people who belong to it obtain certain benefits. A distinction between churches and sects
is also made, where the former are more consistent with the established criteria and the latter the
more deviant. Sects usually attract people with fewer opportunities in the economic development
process. The globalization that we have been experiencing in the previous three decades has brought
continuous increases in the economic growth rate, but also has widened economic inequality within
the most developed countries (Milanovic 2012). This reason could explain the increasing religiosity
and extremism in Europe, and in other advanced industrial areas.
Innovation acceptance (or innovativeness, the term that we most like) could be seriously affected in
the near future by these exclusion reasons. Technologies that have been gestating for years (for instance,
robotics, next-generation genomics, artificial intelligence, automation of knowledge work, Internet of
the Things and some others) will be part of our everyday life in the short term (Manyika et al. 2013).
We could even expect diverse scenarios of religion strictness depending on the degree of the inequality
and exclusion that the innovation process will imply (Levy and Razin 2012).
In that political, social and economic context, it seems necessary to analyze the coevolution
of religious beliefs and scientific-innovative development. Churches are subject to the forces of
competition and collaboration like any other economic or social subject. Smith (1776) maintained that
clergy follow self-interest, and that market forces constrain them as they do with secular firms.
2.2. Reasons Why Religiosity in General May Influence Attitudes towards Innovation
According to the Oxford Dictionary (Simpson et al. 1989), innovation means to: “Make changes in
something established, especially by introducing new methods, ideas, or products”. In view of this
definition, it is not strange that the relationship between religion (old/traditional) and innovation (new)
has been tense. More concretely, we focus on innovation’s economic and social perspective. Thus,
innovation could be well defined as transforming an idea into a solution that incorporates added value
from the client’s point of view. Innovation feeds economic growth from progress in the basic sciences
to the diffusion of new technologies, economic practices and even social change (Bénabou et al. 2015).
Governments, business and society tend to be in favor of more innovation, based on the belief that
it leaves behind far more winners than losers (Mulgan 2016). This belief is known as the pro-innovation
bias (Rogers 1995). To define innovation only considering its positive outcomes is not coherent with
the negative results obtained from some innovations in the past (Rotman 2013). Very few articles
consider the negative influence of innovation (Niilola 2017). Rogers (1995) said that ‘negative effects
of innovation are often unanticipated and most of the undesirable consequences emerge when the
innovation is widely diffused and never comes to the attention of the innovator’. Nevertheless, it
is necessary to differentiate between unanticipated and unintended (de Zwart 2015; Lazarus 2019).
Following Niilola (2018), we could see that pioneers adopting an innovation might only use the product
as it was originally intended, but the following adopters find other uses resulting in unanticipated
and undesirable events. In order to fix this issue, the European Commission has promised to back
responsible innovation, defined as ‘an approach that anticipates and assesses potential implications
and societal expectations with regard to research and innovation, with the aim to foster the design
of inclusive and sustainable research and innovation’ (European Commission 2009). This concept of
innovation overcomes the pro-innovation bias found in previous definitions, but the process for how the
ex-ante evaluation has to be done it is not an easy task because no one can predict how innovations will
evolve or even predict who will benefit or will suffer from their outcomes (Mulgan 2016). The existence
of the good vs. bad innovation dilemma will affect people behavior towards innovation. We can expect
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that the more an individual attends to their beliefs the more are likely to associate innovation outcomes
with negative results because more religious people are more risk averse (Noussair et al. 2013).
Guiso et al. (2003) found that religiosity affects economic attitudes. They analyzed the relation
between religion and six groups of variables: people’s attitudes toward cooperation, women,
government, legal rules, the market economy and its fairness and thriftiness. On average, religion is
associated positively with attitudes that are conducive to free markets and better institutions. Different
religions and the intensity of religious beliefs influence the results: Christians are more positively
associated with attitudes that are conducive to economic growth, while Islam is negatively associated.
The only case in which Protestants seem more pro-market than Catholics is on incentives; trust and
intolerance toward immigrants is associated with worshippers.
The relationship between religion and innovation is mediated by science. Religion and science are
generally considered incompatible. Commonly, religion is viewed as unscientific and the conflict arises
because religious dogmas and practices are less believable when scientific discoveries occur (Brooks 1994).
Innovation involves much more than the research and development activities (for instance: conception,
initial knowledge generation, product engineering, manufacturing and marketing). Most people are
aware of scientific progress when innovation transforms knowledge into commercial products.
Religiosity has an impact on innovation as has been demonstrated by different investigations
(Assouad and Parboteeah 2018; Parboteeah et al. 2015; Audretsch et al. 2007). In Bénabou et al. (2013),
they uncovered a robust negative association between religiosity and innovation, holding across
countries as well as US states. In another study, Bénabou et al. (2015), using all five waves of the
World Values Survey, examined the relationships between eleven indicators of openness to innovation
and five measures of religiosity. They found that greater religiosity was almost uniformly and very
significantly associated to less favorable views of innovation.
Therefore, we proposed the following hypothesis:
H1: There is a negative relationship between religiosity and attitudes towards innovation.
2.3. Religions and Attitudes toward Innovation
From a theoretical perspective, we are interested in the influence potential of religions on
innovation. Eisenstadt (1968) says that this potential refers to “capacity to legitimize, in religious or
ideological terms, the development of new motivations, activities, and institutions which were not
encompassed by their original impulses and views.”. His approach allows assessing the potential impact
that any religion could have on economic activity. For instance, Hinduism does not have a clear position
on economic activity, but the multiplicity of gods and sects and the ritualistic behavior promoted in this
religion might not facilitate any innovation effort in order to obtain economic outcomes. However, the
right interpretation of how this religion negatively affects any economic activity must be found, not in the
sacred texts that support their faith, but in the inflexible institutions and behaviors that their followers
design to discourage new growth values that put in danger the pre-existing status quo (Guiso et al. 2003).
More recent studies address how different faiths approach this question. Michalopoulos et al.
(2016) provide a conceptual framework to think about how Islam is related to inequality and
preindustrial comparative development. They show that for Islam, inequality has to be restrained in
order to survive. They try to implement an income redistribution through religious strictures on capital
accumulation and increased good provision from religious institutions. Conflict and cooperation have
been studied in the Jewish communes as an example of organizations that stress cooperation and
minimize conflict among members (Abramitzky 2008). It is also well documented how Christianity
has influenced the innovation-religion relationship through, for instance, the ancient Inquisition
institution (Findlen and Marcus 2012), enforced laws against usury (Rubin 2011) or a wide variety
of religiously provided public services (education, elderly care, health care and some other social
services; Hungerman 2005). Finally, as we already know, Guiso et al. (2003) found that Christians and
Islamists have different attitudes towards economic growth, therefore the same could be expected in
their acceptance about innovation.
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Consequently, we proposed the following hypothesis:
H2: Innovativeness orientation depends on religion denomination.
3. Data and Methodology
3.1. The Sample
The data comes from the EUROBAROMETER 63.4 that was carried out between the 9th of May
and the 14th of June 2005, at the request of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION. The dataset was accessed
through GESIS (Leibniz-Institute für Sozialwissenschaften). The EUROBAROMETER is part of wave 63.4
and covers the population of the respective nationalities of the European Union member states, resident
in each of the member states and aged 15 years and over. The EUROBAROMETER 63.4 has also been
conducted in the four candidate countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey) and in the northern
part of Cyprus. In these countries, the survey covers the national population of citizens of the respective
nationalities and the population of citizens of all the European Union member states that are resident in
those countries and have a sufficient command of one of the respective national language(s) to answer the
questionnaire. The basic sample design applied in all states is a multi-stage, random (probability) one.
The sample represents the whole territory of the countries surveyed according to the distribution
of the resident population of the respective nationalities in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas.
In each of the selected sampling points, a starting address was drawn, at random. Further addresses
(every Nth address) were selected by standard “random route” procedures, from the initial address.
In each household, the respondent was drawn, at random (following the “closest birthday rule”).
All interviews were conducted face-to-face in people’s homes and in the appropriate national language.
The following table (Table 1) shows the sample size in each country and the total population aged
15 or more years.
Table 1. Sample size by country, total population 15+.
Country Number of Interviews Population 15+
Austria 1.000 6679.444
Belgium 1.000 8508.982
Bulgaria 1.018 6695.512
Croatia 1.000 3682.826
Czech Republic 1.083 8757.710
Denmark 1.051 4380.063
Estonia 1.001 8867.094
Finland 1.024 4279.286
France 1.012 44,010.619
Germany 1.520 64,174.295
Greece 1.000 8674.230
Hungary 1.014 8503.379
Ireland 1.006 3089.775
Italy 1.004 49,208.000
Latvia 1.015 1394.351
Lithuani 1.003 2803.661
Luxemburg 504 367.199
Malta 500 322.917
The Netherlands 1.006 13,242.328
North part of Cyprus 500 157.101
Poland 1.000 31,610.437
Portugal 1.005 8080.915
Republic of Cyprus 505 552.213
Romania 1.004 18,145.036
Slovakia 1.108 4316.438
Slovenia 1.045 1663.869
Spain 1.024 35,882.820
Sweden 1.024 7376.680
Turkey 1.005 47,583.830
United Kingdom 1.347 47,685.578
Total 29.328 442,620.588
Source: European Communities (2005).
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The sample adequately represents the share of the different religious groups in Europe. In the
next table (Table 2), we could compare the percentages in the sample used and the estimations made by
Pew Research Center Religion and Public Life (2015) for Europe in the year 2010. All major religions
were well represented in the sample, and only minority religions (Buddhist, Jewish and Hindu) were
slightly under-represented.
Table 2. Sample representativeness of European religions.
Religion Number of Interviews Percent Pew Research Percent Estimation
Christians
Catholic 13.191 45
74.5
Orthodox 3.719 12.7
Protestant 4.100 14
Other Christian 1.063 3.6
Jewish 25 0.1 0.2
Muslim 1.747 6 5.9
Sikh 8 0 -
Buddhist 41 0.1 0.2
Hindu 16 0.1 0.2
Atheist 1.316 4.5
18.8Non believer /agnostic 3.253 11.1
Other (SPONT.) 415 1.4 -
Do not know (DK) 434 1.5 -
Total 29.328 100 100
Source: Own elaboration based on European Communities (2005) and Pew Research Center Religion and Public
Life (2015).
• Thirteen questions about respondents’ beliefs, attitudes and behaviors towards innovation
and innovative products—attraction to innovations, purchasing intention, innovation meaning,
innovative buying preference, price, innovation as gadgets, innovations as fashion and innovations
simplifying everyday life (dependent variables);
• Two questions regarding religiosity—the first, to what religion faith the interviewee belongs; and
the second, the frequency which they attend religious acts (independent variables);
• Finally, five sociodemographic aspects that arose in the literature review as having a potential
effect on the dependent variables under study—marital status, education, gender, age and type of
community where the interviewee lives (control variables).
For innovative products’ variables that have more than two possible categories of
responses—attraction, purchase and price—we have recoded them in two groups (high and low),
creating a dummy variable equal to one, if the response is in the high group, and zero otherwise. The final
sample for analysis excludes all the missing values and religions with a low rate of respondents—Jewish,
Sikh, Buddhist, Hindu and other2. Sample descriptives are shown in Table 3.
2 In order to decide which variables to include and which categories to delete, we ran an exploratory analysis using the MOSAIC
technique included in the STRUCTPLOT FRAMEWORK developed in R software. Minor Religions in Europe—Jews,
Buddhists, Hindus and Sikhs—and people that spontaneously manifest belonging to a different religion, do not show any
remarkable pattern in their standardized residuals analysis. There are few observations in the sample to obtain significant
statistical results in all the analysis that we run. Hence, we decided not to consider them for analysis.
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Table 3. Sample descriptives.
Variable Categories (Original Scale) n (OriginalSample)
Orginal
Sample Share
Categories
(Analysis) n (Analysis)
Final Analysis
Sample Share Operationalization Value Question
Attitudes and purchasing behavior towards innovation (dependent variables)
1. Attraction Very Attracted 3.825 13.0 Attracted 16.554 59.0 1 In general, to what extent are you
attracted towards innovative
products or services, in other words
new or improved products or
services?
Fairly attracted 12.729 43.4 Not ATTRACTED 11.485 41.0 Referencecategory 0
Not very attracted 8.131 27.7
Not at all attracted 3.354 11.4
DK (missing) 1.289 4.4
2. Purchase More inclined to purchase 7.745 26.4 More inclined topurchase 7.745 28.4 1 Compared to your friends and
family, would you say that you tend
to be . . . ?
Less inclined to purchase 11.919 40.6 As or less inclined topurchase 19.544 71.6
Reference
category 0
As inclined to purchase 7.625 26.0
DK (missing) 2.039 7.0
3. Meaning The creation of new productsand services 14.893 50.8
The creation of new
products and services 14.893 56.7 1
What does “innovation” mean for
you? The creation of new products
or services or the improvement of
existing products or services?
The improvement of existing
products and services 11.395 38.9
The improvement of
existing products and
services
11.395 43.3 Referencecategory 0
DK (missing) 3.040 10.4
4. Buy Do not try the innovative one. 12.736 43.4 Do not try theinnovative one. 12.736 47,4
Reference
category 0
In general, when an innovative
product or service is put on the
market and can replace a product or
service that you already trust . . . ?
Try the innovative product 14.128 48.2 Try the innovativeproduct 14.128 52.6 1
DK (missing) 2.464 8.4
5. Price Even if more expensive. 1.881 6.4 Even if moreexpensive 10.821 40.0 1 You would be willing to replace a
product or a service that you already
use by an innovative one . . .
Only if little more expensive. 8.940 30.5 Never or only if costthe same 16.204 60.0
Reference
category 0
Only if cost the same. 13.232 45.1
Never purchase 2.972 10.1
DK (missing) 2.303 7.9
6. Gadgets Mentioned 23.573 80.4 Mentioned 23.573 80.4 1 Innovative products or services are
most of the time gadgets
Not mentioned 5.755 19.6 Not mentioned 5.755 19.6 Referencecategory 0
7. Fashion Mentioned 20.569 70.1 Mentioned 20.569 70.1 1 Innovative products or services are a
matter of fashionNot mentioned 8.759 29.9 Not mentioned 8.759 29.9 Referencecategory 0
8. Simplify Mentioned 17.288 58.9 Mentioned 17.288 58.9 1 Innovative products or services
often simplify everyday life
Not mentioned 12.040 41.1 Not mentioned 12.040 41.1 Referencecategory 0
9. Image Mentioned 20.937 71.4 Mentioned 20.937 71.4 1 A company that sells an innovative
product or service improves the
image of all its products or servicesNot mentioned 8.391 28.6 Not mentioned 8.391 28.6
Reference
category 0
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Table 3. Cont.
Variable Categories (Original Scale) n (OriginalSample)
Orginal
Sample Share
Categories
(Analysis) n (Analysis)
Final Analysis
Sample Share Operationalization Value Question
10. Survive Mentioned 17.676 60.3 Mentioned 17.676 60.3 1 A company which does not innovate
is a company that will not survive
Not mentioned 11.652 39.7 Not mentioned 11.652 39.7 Referencecategory 0
11. Risky Mentioned 24.498 83.5 Mentioned 24.498 83.5 1 Purchasing an innovative product or
service is risky for the consumer
Not mentioned 4.830 16.5 Not mentioned 4.830 16.5 Referencecategory 0
12. Advantages
exaggerated
Mentioned 20.128 68.6 Mentioned 20.128 68.6 1 The advantages of innovative
products or services are often
exaggeratedNot mentioned 9.200 31.4 Not mentioned 9.200 31.4
Reference
category 0
13. Economic growth Mentioned 17.182 58.6 Mentioned 17.182 58.6 1 Innovation is essential for improving
economic growth
Not mentioned 12.146 41.4 Not mentioned 12.146 41.4 Referencecategory 0
Religiosity (independent variables)
14. Religion Catholic 13.191 45.0 Catholic 13.191 46.5
Do you consider yourself to be . . . ?
Orthodox 3.719 12.7 Orthodox 3.719 13.1 Referencecategory
Protestant 4.100 14.0 Protestant 4.100 14.4
Other Christian 1.063 3.6 Other Christian 1.063 3.7
Jewish 25 0.1 Muslim 1.747 6.2
Muslim 1.747 6.0 Atheist 1.316 4.6
Sikh 8 0.0 Nonbeliever/Agnostic 3.253 11.5
Buddhist 41 0.1
Hindu 16 0.1
Atheist 1.316 4.5
Non believer/Agnostic 3.253 11.1
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 415 1.4
DK (missing) 434 1.5
15. Attendance More than once a week 1.234 4.2 More than once aweek 1.234 4.3
Reference
category
Apart from weddings or funerals,
about how often do you attend
religious services?
Once a week 4.406 15.0 Once a week 4.406 15.2
About once a month 2.563 8.7 About once a month 2.563 8.8
About each 2 or 3 month 2.051 7.0 About each 2 or 3month 2.051 7.1
Only on special holy days 5.651 19.3 Only on special holydays 5.651 19.5
About once a year 2.451 8.4 About once a year 2.451 8.4
Less often 3.656 12.5 Less often 3.656 12.6
Never 7.018 23.9 Never 7.018 24.2
DK (missing) 298 1.0
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Table 3. Cont.
Variable Categories (Original Scale) n (OriginalSample)
Orginal
Sample Share
Categories
(Analysis) n (Analysis)
Final Analysis
Sample Share Operationalization Value Question
Socio-demographic (control variables)
16. Marital Status Married 15.225 51.9 Married 15.225 52.1
Marital Status. Could you give me
the letter which corresponds best to
your own current situation?
Remarried 632 2.2 Remarried 632 2.2
Unmarried, currently living with
partner 2.402 8.2
Unmarried, currently
living with partner 2.402 8.2
Unmarried, having never lived
with a partner 4.463 15.2
Unmarried, having
never lived with a
partner
4.463 15.3
Unmarried, having previously
lived with a partner, but now on
my own
1.097 3.7
Unmarried, having
previously lived with
a partner, but now on
my own
1.097 3.8
Divorced 1.704 5.8 Divorced 1.704 5.8
Separated 424 1.4 Separated 424 1.5
Widowed 3.040 10.4 Widowed 3.040 10.4 Referencecategory
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 243 0.8 Other(SPONTANEOUS) 243 0.8
Refusal (SPONTANEOUS) 98 0.3
17. Education Up to 14 years 4.538 15.5 Up to 14 years 4.538 15.7
How old were you when you
stopped full-time education?
15 years 2.097 7.2 15 years 2.097 7.2
16 years 2.253 7.7 16 years 2.253 7.8
17 years 2.023 6.9 17 years 2.023 7.0
18 years 5.002 17.1 18 years 5.002 17.
19 years 2.419 8.2 19 years 2.419 8.4
20 years 1.371 4.7 20 years 1.371 4.7
21 years 999 3.4 21 years 999 3.5
22 years and older 5.233 17.8 22 years and older 5.233 18.1
Still studying 2.700 9.2 Still studying 2.700 9.3
No full-time education 302 1.0 No full-timeeducation 302 1.0
Reference
category
DK (missing) 391 1.3
18. Gender Male 13.078 44.6 Male 13.078 44.6 Gender
Female 16.250 55.4 Female 16.250 55.4 Referencecategory
19. Age 15–24 years 3.948 13.5 15–24 years 3.948 13.5
AGE. How old are you?
25–34 years 4.733 16.1 25–34 years 4.733 16.1
35–44 years 5.243 17.9 35–44 years 5.243 17.9
45–54 years 4.904 16.7 45–54 years 4.904 16.7
55–64 years 4.559 15.5 55–64 years 4.559 15.6
65 years and older 5.931 20.2 65 years and older 5.931 20.2 Referencecategory
Missing 10 0.0
20. Community Rural area or village 10.989 37.5 Rural area or village 10.989 37.6 Referencecategory TYPE OF COMMUNITY. Would you
say you live in a...?Small or middle sized town 10.385 35.4 Small or middle sizedtown 10.385 35.6
Large town 7.818 26.7 Large town 7.818 26.8
DK (missing) 136 0.5
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3.2. Methodology
Considering that all the variables are categorical in nature, and all dependent variables are binary
(after converting three of them from multinomial to binary as we saw in Table 3), in order to confirm
the multivariate relationships stated in the hypotheses, we select a logistic regression approach.
With the intention of improving the interpretability of the regression coefficients, we use marginal
effects. Marginal effect is a measure of the instantaneous effect that a change in a particular explanatory
variable has on the predicted probability of the dependent variable, when the other covariates are kept
fixed (SAS 2018). The dependent variable is modeled as follows:
y = E(y/x) + ε, (1)
where E(y/x) is the conditional mean function, x is the vector of explanatory variables and ε is the
error term. The conditional mean function is given by:
E(y/x) = F
(
β
′
x
)
, (2)
where F denotes a cumulative distribution function and β denotes the parameters. Therefore,
Pr(y = 1) = F
(
β
′
x
)
. (3)
Marginal effects are obtained by computing the derivative of the conditional mean function with
respect to given by:
∂E(y/x)
∂x
=
∂F
(
β
′
x
)
∂β′x
β = f(β′x)β, (4)
where f (.) is the density function that corresponds to the cumulative function F(.). In this study,
where all the variables are categorical (mostly binary), we would report the difference between the
estimated probability if the variable is equal to 1 and the estimated probability if the variable is equal to
0. The marginal effects are nonlinear functions of the parameter estimates and levels of the explanatory
variables. Hence, they generally cannot be inferred directly from parameter estimates. In this case, we
used the R library called “margins”.
As we have already seen, marginal effects can be defined as the change in the dependent variable
as a function of the variation in other (one or more) independent variables of interest, while all other
variables in the model remain constant. There are three different marginal effects approaches: marginal
effects at the means (MEMs), average marginal effects (AMEs) and marginal effects at representative
values (MERs). Following (Bartus 2005) recommendations, we used MERs because it allows the choice
of a range of values for one or more independent variables, focusing on how marginal effects behave in
that range.
For interpretation purposes, marginal effects are popular because they make available the amount
of change in the dependent variable (Y) that will be given by a 1-unit change in an independent
variable (X). For binary dependent and independent variables, the marginal effect shows how the
probability of the dependent variable P(Y = 1) changes when the independent binary variable changes
from 0 to 1, after controlling the other variables in the model. When you have independent categorical
variables, like in our case religion and religiosity, the marginal effects are interpreted as the difference
in predicted probabilities for cases in one category relative to the reference category. In this paper,
dummy variables were created for each of the categories of religion and religiosity and then marginal
effects were calculated.
Before running the logistic regressions, we checked whether it would be possible to reduce the
thirteen dependent variables to a lesser quantity. In doing so, we ran a factor analysis. Results
showed that it was not adequate to reduce the dependent variables’ dimensionality through a factor
analysis because:
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• The tests in correlations were not significant in approximately 50% of the cases.
• There were three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 that explained only 51% of the total
variance, when the acceptable minimum is 60% (Hair et al. 2014).
• Finally, and most importantly, factors were not interpretable, even when the solution was rotated.
Consequently, we regressed thirteen variables related to innovation on two measures related to
religion together with five sociodemographic controls using logistic regression.
4. Results
4.1. Religion and Innovation Outcomes
Results from the logistic regression applied on the three innovation outcomes variables considered
can be seen in Table 4.
The Orthodox has the worst profile towards innovation outcomes: No other religion has odds
smaller than 1 at significant levels, being this religion is the reference category.
Considering the company image odds, the top position was occupied by the Atheist (odds = 1.667),
followed by a second group composed of agnostic (odds = 1.312), other Christian (odds = 1.298),
Protestant (odds = 1.236) and other (SPONT.; odds = 1.303). All the rest of religious affiliations had no
significant result.
Table 4. Logistic regression results and innovation outcomes.
Dependent Variable:
Company Image Company Survival Economic Growth
Log-Odds Odds Log-Odds Odds Log-Dds Odds
Religion
(Ref. cat.
Orthodox)
Atheist 0.511 ***−0.075 1.667
0.563 ***
−0.072 1.755
0.647 ***
−0.072 1.910
Catholic 0.066−0.044 1.068
0.288 ***
−0.042 1.334
0.182 ***
−0.041 1.200
Muslim −0.074−0.071 0.928
0.309 ***
−0.065 1.362
0.240 ***
−0.0651 1.271
Non believer/Agnostic 0.272 ***−0.061 1.312
0.538 ***
−0.057 1.713
0.539 ***
−0.057 1.714
Other (SPONT. 0.264 **−0.1179 1.303
0.520 ***
−0.111 1.683
0.558 ***
−0.111 1.747
Other Christian 0.261 ***−0.079 1.298
0.657 ***
−0.074 1.930
0.662 ***
−0.074 1.939
Protestant 0.212 ***−0.053 1.236
0.720 ***
−0.05 2.055
0.623 ***
−0.05 1.864
Religiosity
(Ref. cat. More
than once a week)
Once a week −0.095−0.076 0.909
−0.035
−0.071 0.966
−0.019
−0.072 0.982
Once a month −0.058−0.082 0.944
0.137 *
−0.076 1.147
0.132 *
−0.077 1.141
Each 2 or 3 month 0.095−0.084 1.100
0.1707 *
−0.0789 1.100
0.239 ***
−0.077 1.270
On special holy days −0.015−0.075 0.985
0.143 **
−0.07 1.153
0.188 ***
−0.07 1.207
Once a year −0.066−0.083 0.940
0.297 ***
−0.077 1.345
0.228 ***
−0.078 1.256
Less often −0.098−0.079 0.907
0.0567
−0.7315 1.067
0.075
−0.074 1.078
Never −0.177 **−0.077 0.837
0.174 **
−0.071 1.190
0.145 **
−0.072 1.156
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Table 4. Cont.
Dependent Variable:
Company Image Company Survival Economic Growth
Log-Odds Odds Log-Odds Odds Log-Dds Odds
Marital Status
(Ref. cat. Widowed) Divorced
0.204 ***
−0.078 1.226
0.322 ***
−0.069 1.383
0.159 **
−0.07 1.173
Married 0.287 ***−0.057 1.332
0.283 ***
−0.05 1.328
0.236 ***
−0.05 1.266
Remarried 0.440 ***−0.102 1.552
0.340 ***
−0.096 1.405
0.284 **
−0.096 1.328
Separated 0.233 *−0.125 1.263
0.178
−0.115 1.195
0.113
−0.115 1.120
Unmarried.
living with partner
0.328 ***
−0.076 1.388
0.250 ***
−0.069 1.284
0.266 ***
−0.069 1.304
Unmarried.
never lived with
partner
0.328 ***
−0.076 1.282
0.305 ***
−0.0672 1.356
0.196 ***
−0.067 1.216
Unmarried.
previously lived with
partner
0.252 ***
−0.074 1.300
0.301 ***
−0.082 1.352
0.200 **
−0.082 1.221
Other
(SPONTANEOUS
0.001
−0.167 1.001
0.094
−0.152 1.098
0.08
−0.151 1.084
Education
(Ref. cat. No full-time
education)
Up to 14 years 0.445 **−0.181 1.560
0.315 **
−0.148 1.370
0.799 ***
−0.175 2.223
15 years 0.567 ***−0.185 1.763
0.394 ***
−0.152 1.483
0.895 ***
−0.179 2.448
16 years 0.674 ***−0.185 1.962
0.564 ***
−0.151 1.758
1.153 ***
−0.178 3.167
17 years 0.723 ***−0.185 2.061
0.699 ***
−0.152 2.012
1.262 ***
−0.179 3.533
18 years 0.7441 ***−0.1811 2.103
0.690 ***
−0.148 1.993
1.303 ***
−0.175 3.680
19 years 0.878 ***−0.184 2.405
0.878 ***
−0.151 2.407
1.538 ***
−0.178 4.656
20 years 0.884 ***−0.188 2.422
0.919 ***
−0.155 2.507
1.502 ***
−0.181 4.490
21 years 0.879 ***−0.192 2.409
1.061 ***
−0.159 2.889
1.617 ***
−0.185 5.038
22 years and older 1.039 ***−0.181 2.828
0.991 ***
−0.148 2.694
1.765 ***
−0.175 5.844
Still studying 0.974 ***−0.1896 2.684
0.849 ***
−0.158 2.337
1.493 ***
−0.183 4.452
Sex
(Ref. cat. Female) Male
0.180 ***
−0.028 1.198
0.159 ***
−0.026 1.172
0.203 ***
−0.026 1.225
Age
(Ref. cat. 65 years and
older)
15–24 years 0.326 ***−0.074 1.386
0.022
−0.069 1.022
0.176 *
−0.069 1.193
25–34 years 0.360 ***−0.0542 1.433
0.150 ***
−0.05 1.162
0.149 **
−0.05 1.161
35–44 years 0.328 ***−0.051 1.389
0.210 ***
−0.046 1.234
0.198 ***
−0.046 1.218
45–54 years 0.311 ***−0.05 1.365
0.206 ***
−0.046 1.228
0.247 ***
−0.046 1.280
55–64 years 0.252 ***−0.05 1.286
0.229 ***
−0.045 1.257
0.222 ***
−0.045 1.249
Community
(Ref. cat. Rural area) Large town
0.099 ***
−0.035 1.104
0.068 **
−0.0323 1.070
0.0533
−0.032 1.054
Small or middle sized
town
0.01
−0.032 1.010
0.02
−0.029 1.021
0.003
−0.03 1.003
Constant −2.364 ***−0.197 0.094
−2.105 ***
−0.165 0.122
−2.560 ***
−0.19 0.077
Observations 28,052 28,052 28,052
Log Likelihood −16,443.05 −18,262.67 −18,206.29
Akaike Inf. Crit. 32,968.1 36,607.35 36,494.59
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
In relation to company survival odds, Protestants had the highest probability perceiving of
innovation as a key factor for businesses’ future (odds = 2.055). They were closely followed by
other Christian (odds = 1.930), Atheist (odds = 1.755), Agnostic (odds = 1.713) and other (SPONT.;
odds = 1.683). In the lower band we found Muslim (odds = 1.362) and Catholic (odds = 1.334).
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Regarding economic growth, two groups arose. The first one had higher odds considering that
innovation impulses economic growth. It was formed of other Christian (odds = 1.939), Atheist
(odds = 1.910), Protestant (odds = 1.864), other (SPONT.; odds = 1.747) and Agnostic (odds = 1.714).
The second group, with the lowest odds, was composed of Muslim (odds = 1.271) and Catholic
(odds = 1.200).
As result, innovation outcomes perceptions were affected according to religion affiliation. Atheists
appeared in the optimistic leading group for the three variables considered and Orthodox, at the
opposite end of the spectrum, had the lowest odds ratio (1). Among them, we found two different
segments: one formed of those that scored high in the odds for the three variables (Agnostic, other
Christian, Protestant and other (SPONT.)); and the other, with lower probabilities of considering
innovation as a driver to obtain a company’s improved image, to help companies to survive or to
impulse economic growth (Catholics and Muslims).
4.2. Innovation Outcomes Marginal Effects
In order to better interpret these results we used marginal effects (MERs) on the logit models
obtained for each of the innovation outcomes’ dependent variables. It was computed using R’s
“margins” library (Version 0.3.20). We can see in Figure 1 that the pattern found through the odds from
the logistic regression remained.
From Figure 1, we could deduce that, in relation to how innovation affects the company image,
four groups of religions were conformed. The first one, formed by Atheists had marginal effects higher
than 10% (comparing to Orthodox) responding that innovation improved company image. Catholics
and Muslims belonged to the second group, having a profile with marginal effects close to 0%, meaning
that they were very similar to Orthodox and manifested that company image was not significantly
affected by innovation. Halfway between these two groups, with marginal effects about 5%, were
Agnostics, Protestants, other Christians and others. Religiosity (religion attendance) is also printed in
Figure 1 and no association, or clear pattern, could be found.
As Figure 1 shows, religion affected the perception on innovation capacity to be associated with
company survival. On the one hand, we found the group comprised of Protestants, other Christians,
others, Atheists and Agnostics with marginal effects from 10% to 17% higher than Orthodox. On the
other hand, with marginal effects around 5%, appeared for Catholics and Muslims. As religiosity
decreased there was a slight improvement of marginal effects, but it was not relevant enough to
conclude any pattern.
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In short, Europeans’ opinion about innovation’s outcomes depended on religion denomination.
The first group, led by Atheists, Protestants and, at some distance, by other Christians, others and
Agnostics, thought that innovation had a strong association with the company’s image and capacity to
survive, also positively affecting economic growth. Catholics and Muslims made up the second group,
characterized by the belief in innovation’s modest ability to influence organizations’ and economy’s
results. The Orthodox was the least supportive group as to innovation’s capacity of influence.
Furthermore, marginal effects analysis shows that religiosity had not a clear pattern of impact on
the dependent variables.
4.3. Religion and Innovative Product and Service Concept
Following the methodology explained in the previous section, we found that three different
groups emerged (Table 5). The first one was formed of Atheists, Agnostics and Protestants. They
were more likely to declare that innovations are mostly gadgets, that innovative products neither are a
matter of fashion nor risky to consume and that their advantages are often exaggerated. There was
one variable where the probabilities of the three groups did not point in the same direction: Atheists
manifested that innovative products simplify everyday life, and Agnostics and Protestants were more
likely not to agree with this statement.
The second group was composed of Catholics and others (SPONT.). Their probability to answer
that innovations are mainly gadgets was lower than in the previous group and they did not think that
innovative products are mainly a fashion. One of their most differentiated characteristics was that they
were less likely to report that innovative products simplify everyday life and that innovations are risky
for the consumer. Finally, there was a mismatch between these two religion affiliations in relation to
the exaggerated communication of the advantages associated to the innovative products: Catholics
had a lower probability than the reference group of considering this statement as true, whereas for
other (SPONT.), this was just the opposite.
Muslims were quite different from the other groups. They had one of the highest probabilities
answering that innovations are mainly gadgets and a matter of fashion, and the lowest odds saying
that innovative products simplify life or their advantages are exaggerated. Finally, in spite of the fact
that they felt that innovative products are not as risky as the reference category (Orthodox), among the
religions group analyzed in this case, they were at the top.
Religion attendance had no significant coefficients for fashion, simplify life and risky. For the other
two variables, we found that people who more frequently attended religious acts were more probable
to manifest that innovative products are mainly gadgets and their advantages are often exaggerated.
Education also had an effect on the opinion of innovative products. People who stopped their
education earlier were more likely to consider that innovative products are a matter of fashion, do not
simplify life, are less risky and their advantages are not exaggerated.
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Table 5. Logistic Regression Results on Innovation Concept.
Dependent Variable
Gadgets Fashion Simplify Life Risky Advantages Exaggerated
Log-Odds Odds Log-Odds Odds Log-Odds Odds Log-Odds Odds Log-Odds Odds
Religion
(Ref.cat.
Orthodox)
Atheist 0.367 ***−0.088 1.443
−0.213 ***
−0.078 0.808
0.139 *
−0.071 1.149
−0.324 ***
−0.093 0.724
0.410 ***
−0.074 1.507
Catholic 0.188 ***−0.051 1.206
−0.146 ***
−0.042 0.864
−0.326 ***
−0.039 0.722
−0.485 ***
−0.048 0.616
−0.036
−0.042 0.965
Muslim 0.346 ***−0.077 1.414
0.113 *
−0.065 1.120
−0.657 ***
−0.065 0.518
−0.271 ***
−0.079 0.763
−0.402 ***
−0.074 0.669
Non believer/Agnostic 0.286 ***−0.071 1.331
−0.06
−0.06 0.942
−0.111 **
−0.056 0.895
−0.446 ***
−0.073 0.640
0.423 ***
−0.059 1.527
Other (SPONT.) 0.22−0.138 1.247
−0.283 **
−0.123 0.754
−0.277 **
−0.112 0.758
−0.372 **
−0.145 0.690
0.226 **
−0.115 1.253
Other Christian 0.435 ***−0.087 1.545
0.103
−0.076 1.108
0.011
−0.073 1.011
−0.154 *
−0.088 0.857
0.362 ***
−0.075 1.436
Protestant 0.278 ***−0.062 1.321
0.025
−0.051 1.026
−0.163 ***
−0.049 0.849
−0.563 ***
−0.063 0.570
0.366 ***
−0.051 1.442
Religiosity
(Ref. cat. More
than once a week)
Each 2 or 3 month 0.197 **−0.096 1.217
−0.105
−0.08 0.900
0.202 ***
’−0.078 1.224
−0.88
−0.098 0.916
0.198 **
−0.083 1.219
Less often −0.99−0.089 1.104
−0.097
−0.074 0.908
0.037
−0.072 1.037
−0.253 ***
−0.092 0.777
0.158 **
−0.077 1.171
Never 0.157 *−0.086 1.170
−0.118
−0.072 0.889
−0.068
−0.071 0.934
−0.114
−0.088 0.892
0.146 *
−0.076 1.158
On special holy days 0.213 **−0.084 1.237
−0.071
−0.07 0.932
0.089
−0.069 1.093
−0.032
−0.085 0.969
0.216 ***
−0.074 1.241
Once a month 0.183 **−0.092 1.201
−0.012
−0.077 0.988
0.155 **
−0.075 1.168
0.015
−0.093 1.015
0.156 *
−0.081 1.169
Once a week 0.265 ***−0.085 1.303
−0.003
−0.071 0.997
0.03
−0.07 1.031
0.007
−0.086 1.007
0.158 **
−0.075 1.171
Once a year 0.092−0.095 1.097
−0.109
−0.079 0.896
0.047
−0.077 1.048
−0.085
−0.097 0.919
0.173 **
−0.082 1.188
Marital Status
(Ref. cat.
Widowed)
Divorced 0.113−0.083 1.120
0.095
−0.071 1.100
0.137 **
−0.069 1.147
0.136
−0.086 1.146
0.141 **
−0.071 1.151
Married 0.142 **−0.057 1.153
−0.044
−0.05 0.957
0.244 ***
−0.049 1.277
0.018
−0.059 1.019
0.151 ***
−0.05 1.163
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 0.388 **−0.177 1.473
0.177
−0.154 1.194
0.229
−0.149 1.257
−0.051
−0.217 0.950
−0.066
−0.165 0.936
Remarried 0.044−0.119 1.045
0.075
−0.1 1.078
0.366 ***
−0.095 1.442
0.101
−0.121 1.106
0.184 *
−0.098 1.203
Separated 0.410 ***−0.129 1.507
−0.01
−0.119 0.990
0.135
−0.114 1.145
0.262 *
−0.14 1.300
0.024
−0.121 1.024
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Table 5. Cont.
Dependent Variable
Gadgets Fashion Simplify Life Risky Advantages Exaggerated
Log-Odds Odds Log-Odds Odds Log-Odds Odds Log-Odds Odds Log-Odds Odds
Unmarried, living with partner 0.198 **−0.082 1.219
0.029
−0.071 1.030
0.181 ***
−0.068 1.199
0.14
−0.088 1.150
0.203 ***
−0.07 1.225
Unmarried, never lived with partner 0.315 ***−0.078 1.370
−0.041
−0.069 0.960
0.218 ***
−0.067 1.243
0.200 **
−0.083 1.222
0.193 ***
−0.069 1.213
Unmarried, previously lived with partner 0.394 ***−0.095 1.482
0.007
−0.085 1.007
0.265 ***
−0.081 1.303
0.156
−0.106 1.169
0.331 ***
−0.083 1.392
Education
(Ref. cat. No
full−time
education)
15 years 0.159−0.159 1.172
0.351 **
−0.145 1.420
0.266 *
−0.148 1.305
0.493 **
−0.194 1.637
0.754 ***
−0.171 2.125
16 years 0.167−0.159 1.182
0.260 *
−0.146 1.297
0.435 ***
−0.148 1.545
0.572 ***
−0.193 1.772
0.725 ***
−0.171 2.064
17 years 0.083−0.16 1.087
0.308 **
−0.147 1.361
0.516 ***
−0.148 1.675
0.610 ***
−0.195 1.841
0.858 ***
−0.171 2.357
18 years −0.019−0.155 0.981
0.281 **
−0.142 1.324
0.570 ***
−0.144 1.769
0.610 ***
−0.189 1.840
0.817 ***
−0.167 2.263
19 years −0.11−0.16 0.895
0.242 *
−0.146 1.274
0.710 ***
−0.147 2.033
0.464 **
−0.195 1.590
0.754 ***
−0.171 2.126
20 years 0.042−0.166 1.043
0.329 **
−0.151 1.389
0.583 ***
−0.152 1.792
0.513 **
−0.2 1.670
0.940 ***
−0.174 2.561
21 years 0.076−0.171 1.078
0.338 **
−0.155 1.402
0.711 ***
−0.156 2.036
0.551 ***
−0.205 1.735
0.974 ***
−0.178 2.649
22 years and older −0.045−0.155 0.956
0.226
−0.142 1.253
0.715 ***
−0.144 2.045
0.427 **
−0.19 1.532
0.935 ***
−0.167 2.548
Still studying −0.089−0.168 0.912
0.403 ***
−0.153 1.496
0.594 ***
−0.154 1.811
0.449 **
−0.204 1.566
0.893 ***
−0.177 2.444
Up to 14 years 0.171−0.153 1.186
0.339 **
−0.14 1.403
0.176
−0.144 1.192
0.489 ***
−0.188 1.630
0.555 ***
−0.167 1.741
Sex
(Ref. cat. Female) Male
−0.029
−0.031 0.972
−0.142 ***
−0.027 0.868
0.115 ***
−0.026 1.122
0.041
−0.034 1.042
−0.037
−0.027 0.963
Age
(Ref. cat. 65 years
and older)
15–24 years −0.097−0.081 0.907
0.183 **
−0.071 1.201
0.425 ***
−0.068 1.530
−0.497 ***
−0.09 0.608
−0.279 ***
−0.072 0.757
25–34 years −0.215 ***−0.06 0.806
−0.025
−0.053 0.976
0.470 ***
−0.049 1.601
−0.535 ***
−0.065 0.586
−0.326 ***
−0.052 0.722
35–44 years −0.112 **−0.055 0.894
0.058
−0.048 1.060
0.292 ***
−0.046 1.339
−0.341 ***
−0.058 0.711
−0.150 ***
−0.048 0.860
45–54 years −0.165 ***−0.054 0.848
0.002
−0.048 1.002
0.270 ***
−0.045 1.310
−0.312 ***
−0.057 0.732
−0.053
−0.047 0.948
55–64 years −0.027−0.052 0.973
0.008
−0.046 1.008
0.140 ***
−0.045 1.151
−0.215 ***
−0.055 0.806
−0.018
−0.045 0.982
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Table 5. Cont.
Dependent Variable
Gadgets Fashion Simplify Life Risky Advantages Exaggerated
Log-Odds Odds Log-Odds Odds Log-Odds Odds Log-Odds Odds Log-Odds Odds
Community
(Ref. cat. Rural
area)
Large town 0.027−0.039 1.028
0.024
−0.034 1.024
0.091 ***
−0.032 1.095
0.037
−0.041 1.037
−0.045
−0.034 0.956
Small or middle sized town −0.019−0.036 0.981
−0.008
−0.031 0.992
0.027
−0.029 1.027
−0.102 ***
−0.039 0.903
−0.116 ***
−0.031 0.891
Constant −1.883 ***−0.177 0.153
−0.949 ***
−0.157 0.387
−1.241 ***
−0.16 0.289
−1.439 ***
−0.205 0.237
−1.792 ***
−0.183 0.167
Observations 28.052 28.052 28.052 28052 28052
Log Likelihood −13,893.19 17,091.11 18,507.56 −12453.93 −17211.76
Akaike Inf. Crit. 27.86839 34.26422 37.09711 2498986 3450551
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
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4.4. Innovative Product and Service Concept Marginal Effects
Looking at marginal effects (from here onwards, we used the acronym m.e. to report marginal
effects results), we see that the comments and relations already found held. Figure 2 exhibits how
Europeans feel that innovative products are mainly gadgets. The range of variation was tight, going
from m.e. = 2.7% for Catholics to m.e. = 7% for other Christians. Religiosity did not affect the results.
We could also see the Europeans’ opinion about whether innovative products are a matter of
fashion. Results were not significant for Agnostics, other Christians and Protestants (apart from the
already known Buddhists, Hindus, Jews and Sikhs). Analysis in this variable must be done in the
reversed way for interpretation in innovation terms. It means that those who declared that innovation
products are a matter of fashion were less innovative, so the most pro-innovation profile was held by
others (SPONT.; m.e. = −5.7%), followed by Atheists (m.e. = −4.5%). Catholics were in the mid-range
ranking (m.e. = −3%). In the opposite situation, Muslims had a worse opinion of innovation products,
more so than the Orthodox (the reference category; m.e. = 2.5%). Religiosity did not affect the results.
Figure 2 also displays the marginal effects on Europeans’ opinion about whether innovative
products and services simplify their everyday life. Atheists were the top supporters of this statement
(m.e. = 3.3%) and Muslims the top detractors (m.e. = −15%). It has to be noted that the sign of the
marginal effect was negative, meaning that they had an even worse effect on the dependent variable
than the Orthodox (the reference category, chosen for their anti-innovative profile). In the same
situation, with negative marginal effects ranked according to the magnitude of importance of them,
are Muslims (m.e. = −15%), Catholics (m.e. = −7.7%), others (SPONT.; m.e. = −6.6%), Protestants
(m.e. = −3.9%) and Agnostics (m.e. = −2.6%). Religiosity did not affect the results.
Finally, Figure 2 shows the marginal effects of innovative products consumption and the associated
risk perception. All the marginal effects had negative signs, meaning that the Orthodox was the
religious affiliation that felt more at risk when consuming innovative products and services (reversed
scale interpretation). The rest varied between a 2.5% for other Christians and 8.5% for Protestants.
Religiosity did not have a clear pattern of association.
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4.5. Attitudes and Purchasing Intentions for Innovative Products
Coefficients from the logistic regression of attitudes and purchasing behavior of innovative
products on religion affiliations show that Muslims had a different and significant profile from the
other religion affiliations. They were the most attracted to innovative products (odds = 2.073), and the
most likely group to purchase an innovative product that replaces the one that they already trust and
regularly buy (odds = 1.420), even if it was more expensive (odds = 1.086). The probability of buying
more innovative products than their friends and relatives was also the highest (odds = 1.724). Finally,
innovation for them was more associated with the improvement of the existing products than creating
new ones (odds = 1.485; Table 6).
We also found that all the other religion affiliations, except Atheists, formed a group because
the differences among them were not big. Atheists had a slightly upper pro-innovate behavior and
purchasing intentions than the other groups.
Agnostics were one step behind. They declared to be fairly attracted to innovations, more inclined
towards innovative products than their friends and relatives, but they only replaced a product that
they trusted with an innovation only if the price was a little more expensive.
For Catholics, innovations did not imply the creation of new products but the improvement of
existing ones. Should an innovation be introduced in the market, which substitutes an existing product
that the Catholics already trust, they would maintain their fidelity with the old product, and they
would not pay any more for the new one.
Therefore, religion had an effect on attitudes and purchasing behavior of innovative products.
Most of the coefficients related to religion attendance (religiosity) were not significant for all the
dependent variables considered in this section.
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Table 6. Logistic regression results.
Dependent Variable
Gadgets Fashion Simplify Life Risky Advantages Exaggerated
Log–Odds Odds Log–Odds Odds Log–Dds Odds Log–Dds Odds Log–Odds Odds
Religion
(Ref. cat.
Orthodox)
Atheist 0.368 ***−0.078 1.445
0.328 ***
−0.079 1.388
0.379 ***
−0.075 1.460
−0.081
−0.077 0.922
0.419 ***
−0.076 1.520
Catholic 0.180 ***−0.042 1.197
0.049
−0.047 1.050
0.399 ***
−0.042 1.491
−0.303 ***
−0.043 0.739
0.093 **
−0.044 1.097
Muslim 0.729 ***−0.072 2.073
0.545 ***
−0.07 1.724
0.396 ***
−0.066 1.485
0.350 ***
−0.07 1.420
0.082
−0.069 1.086
Non believer/Agnostic 0.110 *−0.06 1.116
0.071
−0.064 1.073
0.451 ***
−0.059 1.569
−0.229 ***
−0.06 0.795
0.190 ***
−0.06 1.210
Other (SPONT.) 0.131−0.118 1.140
0.046
−0.127 1.048
0.448 ***
−0.116 1.566
−0.154
−0.118 0.857
0.273 **
−0.119 1.313
Other Christian 0.132 *−0.077 1.141
0.12
−0.085 1.128
0.427 ***
−0.078 1.532
−0.274 ***
−0.078 0.761
0.206 ***
−0.078 1.228
Protestant 0.079−0.052 1.082
−0.002
−0.058 0.998
0.307 ***
−0.052 1.359
−0.304 ***
−0.052 0.738
0.241 ***
−0.053 1.272
Religiosity
(Ref. cat. More
than once a week)
Each 2 or 3 month −0.017−0.081 0.983
−0.132
−0.091 0.876
−0.069
−0.08 0.933
0.029
−0.081 1.030
0.093
−0.084 1.098
Less often −0.191 **−0.075 0.826
−0.193 **
−0.084 0.824
0.013
−0.074 1.013
0.072
−0.076 1.074
−0.077
−0.078 0.926
Never −0.212 ***−0.073 0.809
−0.155 *
−0.082 0.857
−0.069
−0.072 0.933
0.015
−0.073 1.015
−0.11
−0.076 0.896
On special holy days −0.119 *−0.071 0.888
−0.137 *
−0.08 0.872
−0.015
−0.07 0.985
0.095
−0.072 1.100
−0.085
−0.074 0.919
Once a month −0.044−0.078 0.957
−0.142
−0.088 0.867
−0.011
−0.077 0.989
−0.111
−0.078 0.895
−0.039
−0.081 0.962
Once a week −0.118−0.072 0.889
−0.179 **
−0.082 0.836
0.055
−0.071 1.057
−0.209 ***
−0.073 0.811
−0.051
−0.076 0.950
Once a year −0.155 *−0.08 0.856
−0.149 *
−0.088 0.861
0.052
−0.078 1.053
0.106
−0.08 1.112
−0.098
−0.082 0.907
Marital Status
(Ref. cat.
Widowed)
Divorced 0.123 *−0.07 1.131
0.162 *
−0.088 1.176
0.053
−0.071 1.054
0.215 ***
−0.072 1.240
0.161 **
−0.077 1.175
Married 0.294 ***−0.05 1.342
0.224 ***
−0.067 1.251
−0.048
−0.051 0.953
0.289 ***
−0.052 1.336
0.363 ***
−0.057 1.438
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 0.368 **−0.173 1.445
0.134
−0.166 1.143
−0.142
−0.155 0.867
0.122
−0.156 1.129
0.521 ***
−0.157 1.684
Remarried 0.463 ***−0.1 1.589
0.413 ***
−0.113 1.511
0.015
−0.099 1.015
0.435 ***
−0.099 1.544
0.504 ***
−0.103 1.656
Separated 0.166−0.116 1.180
0.398 ***
−0.131 1.489
−0.117
−0.118 0.890
0.298 **
−0.118 1.347
0.181
−0.124 1.198
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Table 6. Cont.
Dependent Variable
Gadgets Fashion Simplify Life Risky Advantages Exaggerated
Log–Odds Odds Log–Odds Odds Log–Dds Odds Log–Dds Odds Log–Odds Odds
Unmarried, living with partner 0.168 **−0.071 1.183
0.142 *
−0.084 1.152
0.008
−0.07 1.008
0.387 ***
−0.072 1.472
0.449 ***
−0.075 1.566
Unmarried, never lived with partner 0.176 **−0.069 1.192
0.231 ***
−0.083 1.260
−0.137 **
−0.069 0.872
0.179 **
−0.07 1.196
0.352 ***
−0.074 1.421
Unmarried, previously lived with partner 0.178 **−0.086 1.195
0.052
−0.098 1.054
0.093
−0.084 1.097
0.096
−0.086 1.100
0.305 ***
−0.088 1.357
Education
(Ref. cat. No
full−time
education)
15 years 0.092−0.144 1.096
0.127
−0.188 1.136
0.116
−0.154 1.123
0.294 *
−0.155 1.342
−0.247
−0.159 0.781
16 years 0.353 **−0.143 1.424
0.455 **
−0.185 1.576
−0.096
−0.153 0.909
0.507 ***
−0.155 1.660
0.08
−0.158 1.084
17 years 0.343 **−0.144 1.410
0.379 **
−0.186 1.460
−0.029
−0.154 0.972
0.516 ***
−0.156 1.675
0.116
−0.158 1.123
18 years 0.486 ***−0.14 1.626
0.399 **
−0.182 1.491
0.02
−0.15 1.021
0.614 ***
−0.151 1.847
0.234
−0.154 1.264
19 years 0.764 ***−0.144 2.148
0.579 ***
−0.185 1.784
0.057
−0.153 1.059
0.777 ***
−0.155 2.175
0.407 ***
−0.157 1.503
20 years 0.773 ***−0.149 2.166
0.567 ***
−0.189 1.762
−0.097
−0.158 0.907
0.732 ***
−0.16 2.080
0.416 ***
−0.161 1.515
21 years 0.794 ***−0.154 2.212
0.531 ***
−0.193 1.701
−0.115
−0.161 0.891
0.644 ***
−0.163 1.904
0.471 ***
−0.165 1.601
22 years and older 0.873 ***−0.14 2.393
0.687 ***
−0.181 1.989
−0.270 *
−0.15 0.764
0.815 ***
−0.152 2.259
0.658 ***
−0.154 1.932
Still studying 0.844 ***−0.154 2.325
0.560 ***
−0.189 1.751
−0.114
−0.16 0.892
0.764 ***
−0.162 2.147
0.374 **
−0.163 1.453
Up to 14 years 0.028−0.139 1.028
−0.026
−0.182 0.974
−0.1
−0.149 0.905
0.19
−0.151 1.209
−0.374 **
−0.154 0.688
Sex
(Ref. cat. Female) Male
0.308 ***
−0.027 1.360
0.334 ***
−0.029 1.397
−0.065 **
−0.027 0.937
0.070 **
−0.027 1.072
0.226 ***
−0.027 1.254
Age
(Ref. cat. 65 years
and older)
15–24 years 1.298 ***−0.074 3.660
1.125 ***
−0.077 3.079
−0.156 **
−0.07 0.856
1.106 ***
−0.072 3.021
0.843 ***
−0.072 2.323
25–34 years 1.059 ***−0.052 2.885
0.915 ***
−0.059 2.498
−0.230 ***
−0.051 0.794
0.909 ***
−0.052 2.482
0.665 ***
−0.053 1.945
35–44 years 0.835 ***−0.047 2.304
0.709 ***
−0.056 2.032
−0.260 ***
−0.047 0.771
0.785 ***
−0.048 2.193
0.634 ***
−0.05 1.885
45–54 years 0.572 ***−0.046 1.772
0.406 ***
−0.057 1.501
−0.156 ***
−0.047 0.855
0.534 ***
−0.047 1.706
0.469 ***
−0.05 1.598
55–64 years 0.376 ***−0.045 1.457
0.359 ***
−0.057 1.432
−0.101 **
−0.046 0.904
0.347 ***
−0.046 1.414
0.342 ***
−0.049 1.407
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Table 6. Cont.
Dependent Variable
Gadgets Fashion Simplify Life Risky Advantages Exaggerated
Log–Odds Odds Log–Odds Odds Log–Dds Odds Log–Dds Odds Log–Odds Odds
Community
(Ref. cat.
Rural area)
Large town 0.120 ***−0.034 1.127
0.140 ***
−0.037 1.151
−0.057 *
−0.033 0.95
0.081 **
−0.034 1.085
0.085 **
−0.034 1.088
Small or middle sized town 0.107 ***−0.031 1.113
0.069 **
−0.034 1.072
0.006
−0.03 1.01
0.105 ***
−0.031 1.111
0.135 ***
−0.031 1.144
Constant −1.238 ***−0.157 0.290
−2.306 ***
−0.203 0.1
−0.289 *
−0.166 0.75
−1.189 ***
−0.168 0.305
−1.686 ***
−0.172 0.185
Observations 26.212 26.212 25.298 25.817 25.96
Log Likelihood −14,830.99 −14,830.99 −17,155.17 −16,810.79 −16,533.69
Akaike Inf. Crit. 29.74399 29.74399 34.39235 33.70357 33.14938
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
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4.6. Attitudes and Purchasing Intentions for Innovative Products Marginal Effects
Figure 3 shows that Muslims (m.e. 15%) played the leading position in being attracted by
innovations, followed by Atheists (m.e. 8%). Catholics, Agnostics, other Christians and Protestants
form a group that declared not to be very attracted to innovation (m.e. between 2.5% and 4%).
Religiosity did not affect the results.
Muslims and Atheists were the only studied affiliations that had significant marginal effects on
purchasing intentions of innovative products. Muslims were more inclined (m.e. = 11%) to purchase
innovative products than the reference category (Orthodox). Atheists (m.e. = 6.5%) stood in the middle
range between both. Religiosity did not affect the results.
Table 3 also presents the Europeans’ opinion whether innovation means the creation of new
products or the improvement of existing ones. This information should be interpreted as a reversed
scale, meaning that the most strict position regarding innovation would be that only the creation of
new products could be considered as “true” innovation. This explains why marginal effects appeared
with negative signs: The most narrow position, represented by the Orthodox, had an m.e. = 0%, while
all the rest presented negative marginal effects (considering that innovations were also improvements
made to the products that already existed). A group formed by Atheists, Catholics, Muslims, Agnostics,
other Christians and others (SPONT.) also declared sharing a softer approach to innovation (m.e. about
−10%). Protestants were situated in between this group and the Orthodox, with m.e. =−7%. Religiosity
did not affect the results.
The replacement variable depicts the respondents’ opinion about how quickly they would try an
innovation when it comes to the market. Catholics, Agnostics, other Christians and Protestants seemed
to be moderate first adopters of innovative products and services (m.e. about 4% to 7%). An extreme
case appeared, Muslims, showing a top first adopter profile (m.e. = 15%).
The last variable studied in this section resumed the impact that price has on Europeans’ innovative
products purchasing intention. Atheists were the ones who were willing to pay more for innovations
(m.e. = 9.5%). A group formed by Agnostics, other Christians, Protestants and others (SPONT.) were
in the middle range (m.e. from 4% to 6%). Finally, Catholics were in the low range (m.e. = 2%).
Religiosity did not affect the results.
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To summarize, the declared religion was associated with the Europeans’ innovative products
purchasing behavior. Muslims had the most pro-innovation purchasing intentions. Atheists were very
attracted to innovative products and they did not mind if they had to pay more for them. Catholics
were not very attracted to innovative products, albeit accepting they were not only the creation of
novelties but also the improvement of the existing ones. However, they were only willing to try
them if they did not have to pay more. Agnostics, Protestants, other Christians and others (SPONT.)
formed a group characterized for sharing a mid-range, pro-innovative products purchasing intention.
Finally, religiosity did not have any remarkable association with attitudes and purchasing intentions
for innovative products.
5. Discussion, Implications and Conclusions
Results obtained from logistic regression confirmed that religion declared affiliation by Europeans
affected their innovativeness profile in the major religious faiths present in Europe. Therefore,
hypothesis 2 held.
Atheists were the most innovativeness-oriented group. We labeled them as innovation top
supporters due to results obtained from the logistic regression odds and marginal effects. Moreover,
they also had a good forecast, increasing their participation of the total projected population from
18.8% in 2010 to 23.3% in 2050 (Table 7). One would expected Europe to continue its leading position
in having unaffiliated people in comparison, for instance, in comparison to the U.S.A. (McBride 2010).
Table 7. Size and projected growth of major religious groups in Europe, 2010–2050.
2010
Estimated
Population
% in 2010
2050
Projected
Population
% in 2050
Popultation
Growth
2010–2050
%
Increase
2010–2050
Compound
Annual
Growth
Rate (%)
Christians 553,280,000 74.5 454,090,000 65.2 −99,190,000 −17.9 −0.5
Unafiliated 139,890,000 18.8 162,320,000 23.3 22,420,000 16 0.4
Muslims 43,470,000 5.9 70,870,000 10.2 27,400,000 63 1.2
Jews 1,420,000 0.2 1,200,000 0.2 −220,000 −15.2 −0.4
Hindus 1,380,000 0.2 2,660,000 0.4 1,280,000 92.9 1.7
Buddhists 1,350,000 0.2 2,490,000 0.4 1,140,000 85 1.5
Other
Religions 890,000 0.1 1,100,000 0.2 210,000 23.3 0.5
Folk
Religions 870,000 0.1 1,590,000 0.2 720,000 83.1 1.5
Regional
Total 742,550,000 100 696,330,000 100 −46,220,000 −6.2 −0.2
Source: Pew Research Center Religion and Public Life (2015).
Muslims would also increase their participation in the European religion landscape, from 5.9% in
2010 to 10.2% in 2050. In addition, the innovativeness profile obtained from our analysis confirmed that
they have an open, flexible and adaptative concept of how they perceive innovation and the associated
innovative products and services. We labeled them as incremental innovation supporters. For them,
innovations embedded in everyday products and services were the path for reducing the inequalities
caused by technical progress. It was a market approach to obtain the results that historically were
reached through public goods provision from religious institutions. As Michalopoulos et al. (2016)
said, Islam restrained inequality in order to survive. Inequality has been one of the consequences of
the globalization process that we have been living in the past decades. Europe has also suffered these
results (Milanovic 2012). Muslims thought that innovation is good for neither company survival nor
economic growth. Therefore, for them, incremental innovations applied to everyday products was
a route to reduce inequalities caused by technical and economic progress. Their members obtained
advantages not only through the religious nets, but also via market exchange, relaxing the doctrine
about consuming innovative products and services in an evolutioned Club Goods model.
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Christians are, and will be, the largest religious group in Europe. Nevertheless, they will reduce
their share in European population terms from 74.5% in 2010 to 65.2% in 2050 (Table 7). We have
worked with the four Christian traditions (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox and other Christian) that
represented the figures shown in Table 8.
Table 8. Christian traditions in Europe and in the world (2010).
Estimated 2010
European
Poulation
Percentage of
European
Christian
Estimated 2010
World Total
Percentage of
World Total
Catholic 254,441,790 55.7 1,064,610,000 23.9
Protestant 100,880,640 22.1 800,640,000 12.6
Orthodox 98,782,220 21.6 260,380,000 76.9
Other Christians 3,098,870 0.7 28,430,000 10.9
100
Source: Hackett et al. (2012).
Catholic is the most important Christian tradition in Europe. In 2010, they represented almost
more than 254 million people and 55.7% of the European Christians. We labeled their innovativeness
profile as innovation disbelievers. None of the innovation outcomes—company image, company
survival or economic growth—could be easily reached from their viewpoint. All the other variables
accomplished—except perceived risk, meaning and buying—also describe anti-innovativeness modes.
This implies a big challenge for European authorities and innovative companies in Europe.
The Orthodox’ profile was even worse than the Catholic’s. They represented almost 99 million
Europeans in 2010 and 21.6% of the European Christians. We labeled them as innovation detractors
because the risks associated with innovation inhibit their purchasing behavior and the benefits that
would be associated to companies and economic growth.
Protestant was the second most important Christian tradition in Europe that accounted for almost
101 million Europeans in 2010 and 22.1% of the European Christian. Labeled as stingy innovators,
they manifest that innovation is important for companies and economic growth but they are not very
inclined to change the products they trust and they would only do so if they have to pay slightly more.
Other Christians represented only 0.7% of the European Christians in 2010. Their innovative
profile was much closer to the Protestants’. The main differences were that they feel that consuming
innovative products and services is risky and that innovative products are mainly gadgets. That was
why we labeled them as low-profiled stingy innovators.
Finally, Agnostics belonged to the category of unaffiliated in Table 7. Their innovativeness profile,
obtained from the study of the logistic regression’s marginal effects for religion denomination and
religion attendance, is also closely related to the Protestants’ and other Christians’. We concluded that
they were a step down in the innovativeness ladder because they were price-conscious about purchasing
innovative products. We labeled them as price-conscious innovators. Nevertheless, the profile projected
in Figure 4 was practically indistinguishable from the Protestants’. Agnostics, Protestants and other
Christians were the price-conscious consumers of innovative products and services.
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Our analysis shows that religiosity did not seem to have a very strong relationship with attitudes
towards innovation. Hence, our first hypothesis, which says that there is a negative relationship among
religiosity and innovation, did not hold. It was obtained from our marginal effects study and, in some
way, contradicted recent research made by Bénabou et al. (2013, 2015).
While looking for an explanation of the differences among the methodologies used in these
publications and the one used in our study, we found that religiosity it was not equally measured.
Bénabou et al. (2013), used two measures of religiosity corresponding respectively to the answers to the
World Values Survey (WVS) questions: (i) “Independently of whether you go to church or not, would
you say you are: a religious person, not a religious person, a convinced atheist, don’t know”, and: (ii)
“Do you believe in God?—Yes, No, Don’t Know”. We used the one contained in the Eurobarometer that
asks about the interviewee religion attendance. If it is intended to measure how the intensity of religion
beliefs affects innovative perceptions, intentions and purchasing behavior, we thought that religion
attendance was a better proxy than the two WVS questions. Furthermore, innovation is not measured
in the same way: they used (log-) patents per capita at country level taken from World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO). We used the fifteen variables contained in the Eurobarometer. Their
only independent variable is a measure on innovation at a macro level, and the one presented in this
work is more related to a micro/individual level. In any case, a deeper analysis is needed in order to
see how the relationship between innovation /innovativeness and religiosity works.
Innovative companies could take advantage from the outcomes of this paper, by segmenting the
market through the religion profiles of their customers. Innovations/technology life-cycle is based on
the fact that customers do not accept (and buy) innovations and innovative products at the same time.
Following Rogers (1995), it is known that first come the innovators and early adopters (concerned with
the underlying technology and its performance). Afterwards, the early majority pragmatists, the late
majority conservatives and lastly the laggards (much more interested in solutions and convenience)
come onto scene. It has a strong relationship with the innovativeness religion profiles that we have
already described. The link can be graphically seen in the next Figure 5.
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we thought that religion attendance was a better proxy than the two WVS questions. Furthermore, 
innovation is not measured in the same ay: they used (log-) patents per capita at country level taken 
from World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). We used the fifteen variables contained in 
the Eurobarometer. Their only indepen ent variable is a measure on innovation at a macro level, and 
the one presented in this work is more related to a micro/individual level. In any case, a deeper 
analysis is needed in order to see how the relationship between innovation /innovativeness and 
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with the underlying technology and its performance). Afterwards, the early majority pragmatists, the 
late majority conservatives and lastly the laggards (much more interested in solutio s and 
convenience) come onto scene. It has a strong relationship with the innovativeness religion profiles 
that we have already described. The link can be graphically seen in the next Figure 5. 
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Results also had some implications for European Union institutions. It would be interesting
to have regular ad-hoc information about religion and innovation from the Europeans collected,
for instance, via Eurobarometer. The European Commission devotes a lot of effort and money in
order to be one of the most innovative regions of the world. However, this effort it is not well
connected with the information collected from primary sources on a regular basis. From Figure 4
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we could deduce that two areas need a follow-up and a tailored social marketing plan: most of
the Europeans, independent of their declared religious faith, are not very attracted to innovative
products and services, and think that their advantages are often exaggerated. Perhaps this is
the reason why the European Commission launched the Demand Side Policies for Innovation
(https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/policy/demand-side-policies_en). If we could know
the particularities felt by the different religious groups in Europe towards innovation and innovative
products and services, and their evolution, then it would be possible to design a social marketing
campaign to manage and improve the innovation perceived image among the Europeans. It would
also help to balance the measures that historically have been deployed, almost exclusively, to the
supply-side of the innovations.
As we have seen in Table 7, projections for 2050 did not seem to hold the secularization postulates
in Europe (76.7% of the Europeans would have a religion affiliation). While Christian Churches would
still be predominant (65.2% in 2050) they would reduce their share in favor of Islamic creeds (from
5.9% in 2010 to 10.2% in 2050). Religions had different perceptions about innovation that have to be
properly managed by companies and social and political organizations. It should be taken into account
that, on innovation terms in Europe, religion is here to stay and religion matters.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, A.R.-R., M.R.-M. and M.V.R.-G.; Methodology, A.R.-R., M.R.-M. and
M.V.R.-G.; Literature Review, A.R.-R. and M.V.R.-G.; Software, A.R.-R.; Validation, A.R.-R. and M.V.R.-G.; Formal
analysis, A.R.-R. and M.R.-M.; Investigation, A.R.-R.; Data curation, A.R.-R.; Writing the original draft, A.R.-R.;
Review and editing the manuscript, M.R.-M.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
Abramitzky, Ran. 2008. The Limits of Equality: Insights from the Israeli Kibbutz. The Quarterly Journal of Economics
123: 1111–59. [CrossRef]
Assouad, Alexander, and K. Praveen Parboteeah. 2018. Religion and Innovation. A Country Institutional
Approach. Journal of Management, Spirituality and Religion 15: 20–37. [CrossRef]
Audretsch, David Bruce, Werner Bönte, and Jagannadha Pawan Tamvada. 2007. Religion and Entrepeneurship.
Paper Number 6378. Discussion Paper Series; London: CEPR.
Azzi, Corry, and Ronald Ehrenberg. 1975. Household Allocation of Time and Church Attendance. Journal of
Political Economy 83: 27–56. [CrossRef]
Barro, Robert Joseph, and Rachel M. McCleary. 2003. Religion and Economic Growth across Countries. American
Sociological Review 68: 760–81. [CrossRef]
Bartus, Tamás. 2005. Estimation of Marginal Effects Using Margeff. Stata Journal 5: 309–29. [CrossRef]
Basedau, Matthias, Simone Gobien, and Sebastian Prediger. 2018. The Multidimensional Effects of Religion on
Socioeconomic Development: A Review of the Empirical Literature. Journal of Economic Surveys 32: 1106–33.
[CrossRef]
Becker, Sascha O., and Ludger Woessmann. 2009. Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory oF Protestant
Economic History. The Quarterly Jounal of Economics 124: 531–96. [CrossRef]
Bénabou, Roland, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni. 2015. Moral Values and Economic Behavior: Religion and
Innovation. American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 105: 346–51. [CrossRef]
Bénabou, Roland, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni. 2013. Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy of Science,
Religion, and Growth. NBER Working Paper Series 80. [CrossRef]
Bever, Edward, and Randall Styers. 2017. Magic in the Modern World: Strategies of Repression and Legitimization.
Edited by Edward Bever and Randall Styers. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Brooks, Harvey. 1994. The Relationship between Science and Technology. Research Policy 23: 477–86. [CrossRef]
Bruce, Steve. 1992. Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis. Oxford &
New York: Oxford University Press.
Bruce, Steve. 2002. God Is Dead: Secularization in the West. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Bruce, Steve. 2011. Defining Religion: A Practical Response. International Review of Sociology 21: 107–20. [CrossRef]
Religions 2019, 10, 589 33 of 35
Bruce, Steve. 2013. Secularisation: In Defence of an Unfashionable Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carpantier, Jean Francois, and Anastasia Litina. 2019. Dissecting the Act of God: An Exploration of the Effect of
Religiosity on Economic Activity. B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics 19: 1–26. [CrossRef]
Cavalcanti, Tiago V., Stephen L. Parente, and Rui Zhao. 2007. Religion in Macroeconomics: A Quantitative
Analysis of Weber’s Thesis. Economic Theory 32: 105–23. [CrossRef]
Center for Religion Studies. Fondazione Bruno Kessler. 2018. Religion and Innovation. Calibrating Research
Approaches and Suggesting Strategies for a Fruitful Interaction. Lavis: Esperia.
Cooper, Zaki, and Martha Patrick-Morsman. 2019. Why Many of Us Still Have Faith in Religion in This Scientific
Age. The Guardian. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/12/why-many-of-us-still-
have-faith-in-religion-in-this-scientific-age (accessed on 17 October 2019).
Crippen, Timothy. 1988. Old and New Gods in the Modern World: Toward a Theory of Religious Transformation.
Social Forces 67: 316–36. [CrossRef]
Damm, Darlene, Rob Nail, and Adam Hofmann. 2019. The State of the Global Grand Challenges 2019. Edited by
Merry Richter and Leslie O’Neill. Santa Clara: Singularity University.
Davie, Grace. 2002. Europe: The Exceptional Case. Parameters of Faith in the Modern World. London: Darton,
Longman & Todd.
Davis, Erik. 2017. Babalon Launching: Jack Parsons, Rocketry, and the ‘Method of Science’. In Magic in the Modern
World: Strategies of Repression and Legitimization. Edited by Edward Bever and Randall Styers. Philadelphia:
The Pennsylvania University Press, pp. 119–46.
de Zwart, Frank. 2015. Unintended but Not Unanticipated Consequences. Theory and Society 44: 283–97. [CrossRef]
Durkheim, Émile. 1925. Les Formes Élémentaires de La Vie Religieuse. Paris: Alcan.
Durkheim, Émile. 1926. De La Division Du Travail Social. Paris: Félix Alcan.
Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah. 1968. The Protestant Ethic and Modernization: A Comparative View. New York: Basic Books.
European Commission. 2009. Responsible Research & Innovation. H2020. Available online: https://ec.europa.eu/
programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/responsible-research-innovation (accessed on 17 October 2019).
European Commission. 2015. State of the Innovation Union 2015. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the
European Union.
European Communities. 2005. Eurobarometer 63.4. Basic Bilingual Questionnaire Tns Opinion & Social. Luxembourg:
European Communities.
Findlen, Paula, and Hannah Marcus. 2012. Science under Inquisition: Heresy and Knowledge in Catholic
Reformation Rome. Isis 103: 376–82. [CrossRef]
Finke, Roger. 2013. Presidential Address: Origins and Consequences of Religious Freedoms: A Global Overview.
Sociology of Religion: A Quarterly Review 74: 297–313. [CrossRef]
Finke, Roger, and Rodney Stark. 1988. Religious Economies and Sacred Canopies: Religious Mobilization in
American Cities, 1906. American Sociological Review 53: 41. [CrossRef]
Gellner, Ernest. 1992. Postmodernism, Reason and Religion. London: Routledge.
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. 2003. People’s Opium? Religion and Economic Attitudes.
Journal of Monetary Economics 50: 225–82. [CrossRef]
Hackett, Conrad, Brian J. Grim, Marcin Stonawski, Vegard Skirbekk, Michaela Potancˇoková, and Phillip Connor.
2012. The Global Religious Landscape. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. [CrossRef]
Hair, Joseph F., William C. Black, Barry J. Babin, and Rolph E. Anderson. 2014. Multivariate Data Analysis, 7th ed.
Essex: Pearson Education Limited.
Huang, Dan, Dong Lu, and Jin Hui Luo. 2016. Corporate Innovation and Innovation Efficiency: Does Religion
Matter? Nankai Business Review International 7: 150–91. [CrossRef]
Hungerman, Daniel. 2005. Are Church and State Substitutes? Evidence from the 1996 Welfare Reform. Journal of
Public Economics 89: 2245–67. [CrossRef]
Iannaccone, Laurence. 1992. Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other
Collectives. Journal of Political Economy 100: 271–91. [CrossRef]
Iannaccone, Laurence. 1998. Introduction to the Economics of Religion. Journal of Economic Literature 36: 1465–95.
Iannaccone, Laurence. 2006. The Market for Martyrs. Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion 2: 1–29.
Iyer, Sriya. 2016. The New Economics of Religion. Journal of Economic Literature 54: 395–441. [CrossRef]
Lazarus, Suleman. 2019. Where Is the Money? The Intersectionality of the Spirit World and the Acquisition of
Wealth. Religions 10: 146. [CrossRef]
Religions 2019, 10, 589 34 of 35
Levy, Gilat, and Ronny Razin. 2012. Religious Beliefs, Religious Participation, and Cooperation. American Economic
Journal Microeconomics 4: 121–51. [CrossRef]
Liu, Zhen, Qingke Guo, Peng Sun, Zhao Wang, and Rui Wu. 2018. Does Religion Hinder Creativity? A National
Level Study on the Roles of Religiosity and Different Denominations. Frontiers in Psychology, 1–12. [CrossRef]
Manyika, James, Michael Chui, Jacques Bughin, Richard Dobbs, Peter Bisson, and Marrs. 2013. Disruptive
Technologies: Advances That Will Transform Life, Business, and the Global Economy; McKinsey Global Insitute,
May. Available online: http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/disruptive_technologies%
5Cnhttp://www.chrysalixevc.com/pdfs/mckinsey_may2013.pdf (accessed on 17 October 2019).
Marx, Karl. 1843. Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Marx, Karl, and N I Stone. 2014. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr &
Company, (The Project Gutemberg EBook).
McBride, Michael. 2010. Religious Market Competition in a Richer World. Economica 77: 148–71. [CrossRef]
McCleary, Rachel M. 2011. The Economics of Religion as a Field of Inquiry. In THe Oxford Handbook of the Economics
of Religion. New York: Oxford University Press.
McCleary, Rachel M., and Robert Joseph Barro. 2019. The Wealth of Religions. The Political Economy of Believing and
Belonging. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Michalopoulos, Stelios, Alireza Naghavi, and Giovanni Prarolo. 2016. Islam, Inequality and Pre-Industrial
Comparative Development. Journal of Development Economics 120: 86–98. [CrossRef]
Milanovic, Branco. 2012. Globalization and Inequality. In The Globalization of the World Economy. Edited by
Mark Casson. Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
Montgomery, James Douglas. 2003. A Formalization and Test of the Religious Economies Model. American
Sociological Review 68: 782. [CrossRef]
Mulgan, Geoff. 2016. Good and Bad Innovation: What Kind of Theory and Practice Do We Need to Distinguish Them?
London: Nesta.
Niilola, Ian. 2017. Unanticipated and Undesirable Consequences of Technology in Management Research. Helsinki:
Hanken School of Economics.
Niilola, Ian. 2018. Unanticipated and Undesirable Consequences of Innovation. Available online: https:
//www.viima.com/blog/unanticipated-and-undesirable-consequences-of-innovation#concepts (accessed on
17 October 2019).
Norman, Donald A. 1998. The invisible computer: Why Good Products Can Fail, the Personal Computer Is So Complex,
and Information Appliances Are the Solution. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2011. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide, 2nd ed. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Noussair, Charles N, Stefan T. Trautmann, Gijs van de Kuilen, and Nathanael Vellekoop. 2013. Risk Aversion and
Religion. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. [CrossRef]
OECD. 2015. The Innovation Imperative: Contributing to Productivity, Growth and Well-Being. Paris: OECD Publishing.
Pals, D. L. 2006. Eight Theories of Religions. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parboteeah, K. Praveen, Sascha G. Walter, and Jörn H. Block. 2015. When Does Christian Religion Matter for
Entrepreneurial Activity? The Contingent Effect of a Country’s Investments into Knowledge. Journal of
Business Ethics 130. [CrossRef]
Peifer, Jared L., David R. Johnson, and Elaine Howard Ecklund. 2019. The Moral Limits of the Market: Science
Commercialization and Religious Traditions. Journal of Business Ethics 157: 183–97. [CrossRef]
Pew Research Center Religion and Public Life. 2015. The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections,
2010–2050. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, Available online: http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/
religious-projections-2010-2050/ (accessed on 17 October 2019).
Rogers, Everett M. 1995. Diffusion of Innovations. New York: The Free Press.
Rotman, David. 2013. How Technology Is Destroying Jobs. MIT Technology Review 116: 27–35.
Rubin, Jared. 2011. Institutions, the Rise of Commerce and the Persistence of Laws: Interest Restrictions in Islam
and Christianity. Economic Journal 121: 1310–39. [CrossRef]
SAS. 2018. Computing Marginal Effects for Discrete Dependent Variable Models. Available online: https:
//support.sas.com/rnd/app/ets/examples/margeff/index.html (accessed on 17 October 2019).
Sherkat, Darren E. 2017. Religion, Politics, and Americans’ Confidence in Science. Politics and Religion 10: 137–60.
[CrossRef]
Religions 2019, 10, 589 35 of 35
Simpson, J.A., E.S.C. Weiner, and Oxford University Press. 1989. The Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Smith, Adam. 1776. An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edited by A. L. Macfie and
D. D. Raphael. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.
Stark, Rodney. 1992. Do Catholic Societies Really Exist? Rationality and Society 4: 261–71. [CrossRef]
Stark, Rodney. 1999. Secularization, R.I.P. Sociology of Religion 60: 249–74. [CrossRef]
Stark, Rodney, Laurence R. Iannaccone, and Roger Finke. 1996. Religion, Science, and Rationality. The American
Economic Review 86: 433–37.
The Economist. 2013. Has the Ideas Machine Broken-Down? The Economist, January 12.
The Economist. 2019. The Climate Issue —A Warming World. The Economist. Available online: https:
//www.economist.com/leaders/2019/09/19/the-climate-issue. (accessed on 17 October 2019).
Weber, Max. 1930. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London & New York: Rouletge.
Weber, Max. 1946. Science as a Vocation. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Edited by H.H. Gerth and
C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 139–54.
Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and Society. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Yerxa, Donald A. 2016. Religion and Innovation. Antagonists or Partners? London & New York:
Bloomsbury Publishing.
Zielin´ska, Katarzyna. 2013. Concepts of Religion in Debates on Secularization. Approaching Religion 3: 25–35.
[CrossRef]
© 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
